Inductive Scepticism in a Humean World

In this paper I show that David Armstrong is wrong to claim that the regularity theorist must be an inductive sceptic by demonstrating that even those who support worldly ontologies devoid of metaphysical glue (or as Hume might say, necessary connections ‘in the objects’) can justifiably make many inductive inferences. As well as branding the regularity theorist an inductive sceptic, Armstrong also claims that regularity theory (RT) laws have no explanatory value whatsoever. I try to show that Armstrong is also wrong in this respect, and that as a matter of fact, observed regularities are best explained by laws of this kind, or at least something like them.
Keywords Regularity Theory  Inductive Scepticism  Armstrong  Laws  Explanation
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PhilPapers Archive Benjamin T. H. Smart, Inductive Scepticism in a Humean World
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