David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Review 68 (April):141-56 (1959)
SUPPOSE that I report that I have at this moment a roundish, blurry-edged after-image which is yellowish towards its edge and is orange towards its centre. What is it that I am reporting?l One answer to this question might be that I am not reporting anything, that when I say that it looks to me as though there is a roundish yellowy orange patch of light On the wall I am expressing some sort of temptation, the temptation to say that there is a roundish yellowy orange patch on the wall. This is perhaps Wittgenstein's view in the Philosophical Investigations. Similarly, when I "report" a pain, I am not really reporting anything, but am doing a sophisticated sort of wince. 2 I prefer most of the time to discuss an afterimage rather than a pain, because the word "pain" brings in something which is irrelevant to my purpose: the notion of "distress." I think that "he is in pain" entails "he is in distress," that is, that he is in a certain agitation-condition.3 Similarly, to say "I am in pain" may be to do more than "replace pain behavior": it may be partly to report something, though this something is quite nonmysterious, being an agitation-condition, and so susceptible of behavioristic analysis. The suggestion I wish if possible to avoid is a different one, namely that "I am in pain" is a genuine report, and that what it reports is an irreducibly psychical something. And similarly the suggestion I wish to resist is also that to say "I have a yellowish orange after-image" is to report something irreducibly psychical.
|Keywords||Brain Consciousness Process Sensation|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Jessica M. Wilson (2014). No Work for a Theory of Grounding. Inquiry 57 (5-6):535–579.
Andrew Brenner (2015). Mereological Nihilism and Theoretical Unification. Analytic Philosophy 56 (4):318-337.
Worth Boone & Gualtiero Piccinini (2016). The Cognitive Neuroscience Revolution. Synthese 193 (5):1509-1534.
William Lycan (2009). Giving Dualism its Due. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):551-563.
Theodore Sider (1996). All the World's a Stage. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (3):433 – 453.
Similar books and articles
M. C. Bradley (1963). Sensations, Brain-Processes, and Colours. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (December):385-93.
Eric A. Salzen (2002). The Feeling of Pain and the Emotion of Distress. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (4):471-471.
Thomas W. Polger & Kenneth J. Sufka (2005). Closing the Gap on Pain: Mechanism, Theory, and Fit. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/MIT Press
Tim Crane (2003). The Intentional Structure of Consciousness. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press 33-56.
Marshall Devor (2007). Pain, Cortex, and Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):89-90.
W. D. Joske (1960). Sensations and Brain Processes: A Reply to Professor Smart. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38 (2):157-60.
Edmund Keogh & Anita Holdcroft (2002). Sex Differences in Pain: Evolutionary Links to Facial Pain Expression. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (4):465-465.
Kenneth J. Sufka & Michael P. Lynch (2000). Sensations and Pain Processes. Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):299-311.
Nico H. Frijda (2002). What is Pain Facial Expression For? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (4):460-460.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads855 ( #503 of 1,793,064 )
Recent downloads (6 months)157 ( #1,322 of 1,793,064 )
How can I increase my downloads?