The content of physicalism

Philosophical Quarterly 28 (October):339-41 (1978)
Abstract
It has been said that physicalism is an empty doctrine, Because if new forces are needed to explain biological or psychological phenomena they will have to be incorporated into physics. In reply it is argued that we can tie physicalism to present day physics. There may be revolutionary changes in physics but these are likely to affect only the field of elementary particles and cosmology. Our understanding of such things as the nervous system or of protein molecules is unlikely to be affected
Keywords Metaphysics  Mind  Physicalism  Chomsky, N
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