Online research in philosophy

Suppose there is a red ball against a uniformly gray background moving toward my left. I am seeing the moving red ball. I am having a visual experience that carries the information (among other things) that [the ball] is red.1 Now supposing that I have the concepts RED and SEEING, and all my other cognitive (including introspective) mechanisms are intact and working normally, the job is to say exactly how I do come to know that I am seeing [the ball] as red. How do I come to know, as I shall sometimes put it, that I am seeing red?

In Laws book X Plato tries to give us conclusive evidence that there are at least two gods (one good and the other bad). The reasoning depends crucially on the idea of ‘self moving motion.’ In this paper I try to show that the ‘evidence’ is not persuasive. (Nevertheless, the idea of ‘self – moving motion is interesting.).

Feng Youlan emphasizes the concept of “creativity” in his article “Explanation of Mencius’ Chapter on Strong, Moving Vital Force”, in particular highlighting the problem whether the “strong, moving vital force” is “innate” or “acquired”. Cheng Hao and Zhu Xi believed the “strong, moving vital force” was endowed by Heaven, so was therefore innate; “nourishment” cleared fog and allowed one to “recover one’s original nature”. Mencius’ theory on “the good of human nature” is illustrated in the concept of integrated “original endowment”. So Cheng Hao and Zhu Xi’s theory of “recovering the original nature” proposed that the “strong, moving vital force” was innate, which is in complete agreement with Mencius and of which there is ample evidence in Mencius . However, “nature” is “created by the accumulation of righteousness”. Namely, it is the completion and presentation of the process of creation and transformation of human beings. Only when we consider both Cheng Hao and Zhu Xi’s theory and Feng Youlan’s theory can we fully understand Mencius’ theory of “the nourishment of the strong, moving vital force”, which is of great theoretical and academic value in accurately understanding Mencius and the Confucian theory of mind-nature.

This is a difficult choice on any view. To make it a test for the value of equality, I want to suppose that the case has the following feature: the gain to the first child of moving to the suburb is substantially greater than the gain to the second child of moving to the city.

In “Defining the Moving Image” Noël Carroll proposes the following necessary conditions for achieving his task: in his view, x is a moving image (1) only if x is a detached display, (2) only if x belongs to the class of things from which the impression of movement is technically possible, (3) only if performance tokens of x are generated by a template that is a token, and (4) only if performance tokens of x are not artworks in their own right.”1 Later he adds a fifth condition: (5) x is a moving image only if it is twodimensional.2 I will argue that the third condition is circular, while none of the remaining conditions are in fact necessary. The first condition. Something is a “moving image” only if it is a “detached display.” To use one of Carroll’s examples, if I’m watching a horse race (even through binoculars), “I can still orient myself spatially to the finish line.” But “Suppose that I am watching Casablanca and what I see on the screen is Rick’s bar. I cannot, on the basis of the image, orient my body to the bar – to the spatial coordinates of that structure as it existed some time in the early forties in California (nor could I orient my body by means of the image to the putative fictional locale [in North Africa] of the film).”.

A standard objection to the moving spotlight theory of time is that it is incompatible with special relativity. I show how to formulate the moving spotlight theory so that it is perfectly compatible with special relativity. There is no need to re-interpret the physics or add to it a notion of absolute simultaneity.

The moving frame of a tracking or crane shot, or of a camera tilt or pan, can affect the way we engage with a film narrative. In this paper, I argue that certain uses of the moving frame in narrative fiction film prescribe us to imagine ourselves moving through the world of the film. The existence of such an imaginative prescription ultimately threatens the necessity of the cinematic narrator. In light of the standard indeterminacy of our means of access to fictions, the prescription to imagine moving is not accompanied by a prescription to imagine a narrator providing us with a moving view.

Feng Youlan emphasizes the concept of "creativity" in his article "Explanation of Mencius' Chapter on Strong, Moving Vital Force", in particular highlighting the problem whether the "strong, moving vital force" is "innate" or "acquired". Cheng Hao and Zhu Xi believed the "strong, moving vital force" was endowed by Heaven, so was therefore innate; "nourishment" cleared fog and allowed one to "recover one's original nature". Mencius' theory on "the good of human nature" is illustrated in the concept of integrated "original endowment". So Cheng Hao and Zhu Xi's theory of "recovering the original nature" proposed that the "strong, moving vital force" was innate, which is in complete agreement with Mencius and of which there is ample evidence in Mencius. However, "nature" is "created by the accumulation of righteousness". Namely, it is the completion and presentation of the process of creation and transformation of human beings. Only when we consider both Cheng Hao and Zhu Xi's theory and Feng Youlan's theory can we fully understand Mencius' theory of "the nourishment of the strong, moving vital force", which is of great theoretical and academic value in accurately understanding Mencius and the Confucian theory of mind-nature. /// 冯友兰先生《孟子浩然之气章解》一文，拈出"生"这一概念，特别凸显出 浩然之气是"先天"还是"后天"的问题。程朱认为浩然之气乃人禀自于天，为先 天本有:所谓"养"只是去除蒙蔽以"复其初"。孟子的"性本善"是在整体性 的"才"的观念中，得到全面的展现。程朱"浩然之气"为人先天所有的"复其初" 说，在《孟子》中有充分的根据，但这个"先天"是"集义所生"即经实存创生 转化历程的实现与呈显。把程朱的先天说和子马先生的创生说统一起来，才能全面地 理解孟子"养浩然之气"的意义。这对准确理解孟子和儒家心性论的精神实质，具 有理论和学术价值。.