David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Cambridge University Press (1973)
Two essays on utilitarianism, written from opposite points of view, by J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams. In the first part of the book Professor Smart advocates a modern and sophisticated version of classical utilitarianism; he tries to formulate a consistent and persuasive elaboration of the doctrine that the rightness and wrongness of actions is determined solely by their consequences, and in particular their consequences for the sum total of human happiness. This is a revised version of Professor Smart's famous essay 'an outline of a system of utilitarian ethics', first published in 1961 but long unobtainable. In Part II Bernard Williams offers a sustained and vigorous critique of utilitarian assumptions, arguments and ideals. He finds inadequate the theory of action implied by utilitarianism, and he argues that utilitarianism fails to engage at a serious level with the real problems of moral and political philosophy, and fails to make sense of notions such as integrity, or even human happiness itself. Both authors are agreed on utilitarianism's importance: it cuts across a number of different philosophical disputes and combines a systematic account of mata-ethical problems with a distinctive and substantive moral stand. It thus is, or involves, philosophy in both the traditional and the narrower, professional sense of the word, and is a key topic (often the first topic) in introductory philosophy courses. This book should also be of interest to welfare economists, political scientists and decision-theorists.
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$5.55 used (82% off) $25.49 new (16% off) $25.72 direct from Amazon (15% off) Amazon page|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Regina A. Rini (2015). How Not to Test for Philosophical Expertise. Synthese 192 (2):431-452.
Kevin Tobia, Wesley Buckwalter & Stephen Stich (2013). Moral Intuitions: Are Philosophers Experts? Philosophical Psychology 26 (5):629-638.
Amia Srinivasan (2015). Normativity Without Cartesian Privilege. Philosophical Issues 25 (1):273-299.
Guy Kahane (2012). On the Wrong Track: Process and Content in Moral Psychology. Mind and Language 27 (5):519-545.
Moti Mizrahi (2015). Three Arguments Against the Expertise Defense. Metaphilosophy 46 (1):52-64.
Similar books and articles
Baruch A. Brody (1970). Moral Rules and Particular Circumstances. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,Prentice-Hall.
John Stuart Mill (2009). Utilitarianism. In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. Oxford University Press
Jimmy Lenman (2004). Utilitarianism and Obviousness. Utilitas 16 (3):322-325.
H. A. Bedau (1985). The Limits of Utilitarianism and Beyond:Utilitarianism and Beyond. Amartya Sen, Bernard Williams; The Limits of Utilitarianism. Harlan B. Miller, William H. Williams. [REVIEW] Ethics 95 (2):333-.
J. Moreh (1992). Economic Analysis, Common-Sense Morality and Utilitarianism. Erkenntnis 37 (1):115 - 143.
Gerald Lang (2004). A Dilemma for Objective Act-Utilitarianism. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 3 (2):221-239.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads267 ( #8,727 of 1,907,654 )
Recent downloads (6 months)29 ( #25,359 of 1,907,654 )
How can I increase my downloads?