David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Philosophy of Education 46 (3):461-471 (2012)
This paper is the sequel to Part 1, which appeared in this Journal, Vol. 46 No. 2, 2012. Following Cavell and his insistence that we should not try to escape from the existential conditions we find ourselves in and look for false certainties, the relevance of embracing a particular stance is elaborated. A commitment to giving substance to an ideal of ‘the good life’ is neither an injustice towards the other nor an ignorance of her freedom. On the contrary, here responsibility is accepted and at the same time it is acknowledged that we always have only the particular points of departure that we contingently start from. Coming to terms with this kind of dependency constitutes living out the scepticism that is implied by our being human: the logic of this is given along with our human condition
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References found in this work BETA
Stanley Cavell (1988). In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and Romanticism. University of Chicago Press.
Stanley Cavell (1979/1999). The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy. Oxford University Press.
Stanley Cavell & Russell B. Goodman (eds.) (2005). Contending with Stanley Cavell. Oxford University Press.
Martin Gustafsson (2005). Perfect Pitch and Austinian Examples: Cavell, McDowell, Wittgenstein, and the Philosophical Significance of Ordinary Language. Inquiry 48 (4):356 – 389.
Stephen Mulhall (2000). Misplacing Freedom, Displacing the Imagination: Cavell and Murdoch on the Fact/Value Distinction. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 47:255-277.
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