A Simple Theory of Introspection

In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press (2012)
Abstract
This chapter develops a simple theory of introspection on which a mental state is introspectively accessible just by virtue of the fact that one is in that mental state. This theory raises two questions: first, a generalization question: which mental states are introspectively accessible; and second, an explanatory question: why are some mental states introspectively accessible, rather than others, or none at all? In response to the generalization question, I argue that a mental state is introspectively accessible if and only if it is phenomenally individuated. And in response to the explanatory question, I argue that a mental state is introspectively accessible if and only if it is among the determinants of justification. This provides the basis of an argument for a phenomenal conception of justification, according to which a mental state is among the determinants of justification if and only if it is phenomenally individuated.
Keywords self-knowledge  introspection  consciousness  infallibility  self-intimation  constitutivism  rationality
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