Control, responsibility, and moral assessment

Philosophical Studies 138 (3):367 - 392 (2008)
Abstract
Recently, a number of philosophers have begun to question the commonly held view that choice or voluntary control is a precondition of moral responsibility. According to these philosophers, what really matters in determining a person’s responsibility for some thing is whether that thing can be seen as indicative or expressive of her judgments, values, or normative commitments. Such accounts might therefore be understood as updated versions of what Susan Wolf has called “real self views,” insofar as they attempt to ground an agent’s responsibility for her actions and attitudes in the fact (when it is a fact) that they express who she is as a moral agent. As such, they seem to be open to some of the same objections Wolf originally raised to such accounts, and in particular to the objection that they cannot license the sorts of robust moral assessments involved in our current practices of moral responsibility. My aim in this paper is to try to respond to this challenge, by clarifying the kind of robust moral assessments I take to be licensed by (at least some) non-volitional accounts of responsibility and by explaining why these assessments do not in general require the agent to have voluntary control over everything for which she is held responsible. I also argue that the limited applicability of the distinction between “bad agents” and “blameworthy agents” on these accounts is in fact a mark in their favor.
Keywords Responsibility  Blame  Moral Assessment  Real Self Views  Accountability  Control
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    References found in this work BETA
    Robert Merrihew Adams (1985). Involuntary Sins. Philosophical Review 94 (1):3-31.
    Pamela Hieronymi (2006). Controlling Attitudes. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):45-74.

    View all 21 references

    Citations of this work BETA
    Coleen Macnamara (2011). Holding Others Responsible. Philosophical Studies 152 (1):81-102.
    Neil Levy (2013). The Importance of Awareness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):221-229.

    View all 17 citations

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