Can the New Tenseless Theory of Time Be Saved by Individual Essences?

Philo 10 (1):66-68 (2007)
Abstract
I will begin by conceding that some of Beer’s arguments are sound (mostly on pages before the last page), and observe that Beer’s theory that “now” ascribes an individual essence to a time on each occasion of its tokening is a novel theory that seems fruitful and is worthy of being pursued and of being developed to deal with the criticisms in the following points
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