David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy Today 45 (3):242-253 (2001)
In this paper I outline Donald Davidson’s account of two forms of irrationality, akrasia and self-deception, and relate this account to ethical action and belief. His view of irrationality is generally a Freudian one, to the effect that agents must compartmentalize both offending particular mental contents, and governing second order principles. Davidson also hints that his account of akrasia and self-deception might show certain normative and meta-ethical theories to be irrational, insofar as they too engender irrationality. I explore these hints, and hopefully show both that Davidson is correct about irrationality and correct that certain ethical theories engender irrationality as well. I believe this to be no great loss to ethics generally, but will hopefully aid our understanding of how ethical action and belief actually happen
|Keywords||Donald Davidson Irrationality Normative Ethics|
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George W. Watson, R. Edward Freeman & Bobby Parmar (2008). Connected Moral Agency in Organizational Ethics. Journal of Business Ethics 81 (2):323 - 341.
George W. Watson, R. Edward Freeman & Bobby Parmar (2008). Connected Moral Agency in Organizational Ethics. Journal of Business Ethics 81 (2):323-341.
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