Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (3):305-320 (2002)
|Abstract||Evaluative judgements have both belief-like and desire-like features. While cognitivists think that they can easily explain the belief-like features, and have trouble explaining the desire-like features, non-cognitivists think the reverse. I argue that the belief-like features of evaluative judgement are quite complex, and that these complexities crucially affect the way in which an agent's values explain her actions, and hence the desire-like features. While one form of cognitivism can, it turns out that non-cognitivism cannot, accommodate all of these complexities. The upshot is that that form of cognitivism can explain both features of evaluative judgements, and that non-cognitivism can explain neither.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Mark Bryant Budolfson (forthcoming). Non-Cognitivism and Rational Inference. Philosophical Studies.
Andrew McGonigal (2006). The Autonomy of Aesthetic Judgement. British Journal of Aesthetics 46 (4):331-348.
Chris Meyers (2005). Wants and Desires: A Critique of Conativist Theory of Motivation. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:357-370.
Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (2006). Moral Internalism and Moral Cognitivism in Hume's Metaethics. Synthese 152 (3):353 - 370.
Nick Zangwill (2009). Non-Cognitivism and Motivation. In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave Macmillan.
Andrew Sepielli (2012). Normative Uncertainty for Non-Cognitivists. Philosophical Studies 160 (2):191-207.
Adam M. Croom (2010). Thick Concepts, Non-Cognitivism, and Wittgenstein's Rule Following Considerations. South African Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):286-309.
Krister Bykvist & Jonas Olson (2009). Expressivism and Moral Certitude. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):202-215.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads37 ( #31,973 of 549,198 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,397 of 549,198 )
How can I increase my downloads?