Oxford University Press (2000)
|Abstract||Saul Smilansky presents an original new approach to the problem of free will, which lies at the heart of morality and self-understanding. He maintains that the key to the problem is the role played by illusion. Smilansky boldly claims that we could not live adequately with a complete awareness of the truth about human freedom and that illusion lies at the center of the human condition|
|Keywords||Compatibilism Free Will Illusion Metaphysics Monism|
|Buy the book||$34.99 used (31% off) $39.90 new (21% off) $46.67 direct from Amazon (7% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||BJ1461.S65 2000|
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