Godel's theorem: A proof from the book?
| Abstract | Here’s one version G¨ odel’s 1931 First Incompleteness Theorem: If T is a nice, sound theory of arithmetic, then it is incomplete, i.e. there are arithmetical sentences ϕ such that T proves neither ϕ nor ¬ϕ. There are three things here to explain straight away. | |||||||||
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N. Shankar (1994). Metamathematics, Machines, and Gödel's Proof. Cambridge University Press.
Yi-Zhuang Chen (2004). Edgar Morin's Paradigm of Complexity and Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem. World Futures 60 (5 & 6):421 – 431.
Zofia Adamowicz & Teresa Bigorajska (2001). Existentially Closed Structures and Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem. Journal of Symbolic Logic 66 (1):349-356.
Mark Steiner (2001). Wittgenstein as His Own Worst Enemy: The Case of Gödel's Theorem. Philosophia Mathematica 9 (3):257-279.
Peter Smith (2007). An Introduction to Gödel's Theorems. Cambridge University Press.
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