How to Endure an Alleged Paradox

Stephen Barker and Phil Dowe have argued, through what they call the mereological paradox, that endurantism is contradictory. In this paper, I take issue with Barker and Dowe’s argument. In addition to disarming an interesting philosophical argument against endurantism, my diagnosis of Barker and Dowe’s mereological paradox underscores what is central to the endurantism/perdurantism debate and reveals the inadequacy of a familiar way of describing enduring objects
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DOI 10.5840/jpr_2008_11
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