|Abstract||I am interested in the philosophical prospects of what is called ‘predicativism given the natural numbers’. And today, in particular, I want to critically discuss one argument that has been offered to suggest that this kind of predicativism can’t have a stable philosophical motivation. Actually you don’t really need to know about predicativism to find some stand-alone interest in the theme I will be discussing. But still, it’s worth putting things into context. So I’m going to start by spending a bit of time introducing you to the background.|
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