David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 156 (2):231 - 247 (2011)
This paper presents a new argument against A-theories of time. A-theorists hold that there is an objective now (present moment) and an objective flow of time, the latter constituted by the movement of the objective now through time. A-theorists therefore want to draw different pictures of reality—showing the objective now in different positions—depending upon the time at which the picture is drawn. In this paper it is argued that the times at which the different pictures are drawn may be taken to be normal times or hypertimes. If they are normal times then the A-theory is inconsistent, or else collapses to the B-theory—and appealing to primitive tense operators will not help A-theorists avoid this conclusion. If the times are hypertimes then the A-theory is consistent, but deeply problematic none the less
|Keywords||Time A-theory B-theory Flow Passage Becoming McTaggart|
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References found in this work BETA
Caspar Hare (2003). On Myself, and Other, Less Important, Subjects. Dissertation, Princeton University
Tim Maudlin (2007/2009). The Metaphysics Within Physics. Oxford University Press.
Storrs McCall (1976). Objective Time Flow. Philosophy of Science 43 (3):337-362.
Storrs McCall (1998). Time Flow Does Not Require a Second Time Dimension. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2):317 – 322.
J. Ellis McTaggart (1908). The Unreality of Time. Mind 17 (68):457-474.
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