Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):109-131 (1995)
|Abstract||The idea that there is such an analytic connection will hardly come as news. It amounts to no more and no less than an endorsement of the claim that all reasons are 'internal', as opposed to 'external', to use Bernard Williams's terms (Williams 1980). Or, to put things in the way Christine Korsgaard favours, it amounts to an endorsement of the 'internalism requirement' on reasons (Korsgaard 1986). But how exactly is the internalism requirement to be understood? What does it tell us about the nature of reasons? And where-in lies its appeal? My aim in this paper is to answer these ques- tions.|
|Keywords||internalism requirement Bernard Williams Christine Korsgaard|
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