David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Behavior and Philosophy 18 (1):1-18 (1990)
The neobehaviorist Clark L. Hull and his disciple Kenneth Spence shared in common many views on the nature of science and the role of theories in psychology. However, a telling exchange in their correspondence of the early 1940s reveals a disagreement over the nature of intervening variables in behavior theory. Spence urged Hull to abandon his interpretations of intervening variables in terms of physiological models in favor of positivistic, purely mathematical interpretations that conflicted with Hull's mechanistic explanatory aims and ontological commitment to materialism. This dispute is set against the background of similar disputes in physics, and the origins of Hull's and Spence's divergent views on theoretical explanation are described
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Ron Amundson & Laurence D. Smith (1984). Clark Hull, Robert Cummins, and Functional Analysis. Philosophy of Science 51 (December):657-666.
Alex Rosenberg (1992). Selection and Science: Critical Notice of David Hull's Science as a Process. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 7 (2):217-228.
Gregory J. Madden (2001). Concerns of Old, Revisited. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (3):543-544.
Todd A. Grantham (2000). Evolutionary Epistemology, Social Epistemology, and the Demic Structure of Science. Biology and Philosophy 15 (3):443-463.
Eugenie Gatens-Robinson (1993). Why Falsification is the Wrong Paradigm for Evolutionary Epistemology: An Analysis of Hull's Selection Theory. Philosophy of Science 60 (4):535-557.
K. Brad Wray (2000). Invisible Hands and the Success of Science. Philosophy of Science 67 (1):163-175.
Alexander Gebharter & Marie I. Kaiser (2014). Causal Graphs and Biological Mechanisms. In Marie I. Kaiser, Oliver Scholz, Daniel Plenge & Andreas Hüttemann (eds.), Explanation in the special sciences: The case of biology and history. Springer 55-85.
Paul E. Griffiths (2000). David Hull's Natural Philosophy of Science. Biology and Philosophy 15 (3):301-310.
Sam S. Rakover (1997). Can Psychology Provide a Coherent Account of Human Behavior? A Proposed Multiexplanation-Model Theory. Behavior and Philosophy 25 (1):43 - 76.
Todd Grantham (1994). Does Science Have a “Global Goal?”: A Critique of Hull's View of Conceptual Progress. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 9 (1):85-97.
Marc Ereshefsky & Makmiller Pedroso (2013). Biological Individuality: The Case of Biofilms. Biology and Philosophy 28 (2):331-349.
Robert C. Cummins (1983). Analysis and Subsumption in the Behaviorism of Hull. Philosophy of Science 50 (March):96-111.
Paul A. Roth (1991). Truth in Interpretation: The Case of Psychoanalysis. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 21 (2):175-195.
Barbara Gabriella Renzi (2009). A Type Hierarchy of Selection Processes for the Evaluation of Evolutionary Analogies. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 40 (2):311 - 336.
Added to index2011-05-29
Total downloads9 ( #393,699 of 2,117,590 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #219,397 of 2,117,590 )
How can I increase my downloads?