Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):273-300 (2012)
|Abstract||This paper argues that justification is accessible in the sense that one has justification to believe a proposition if and only if one has higher-order justification to believe that one has justification to believe that proposition. I argue that the accessibility of justification is required for explaining what is wrong with believing Moorean conjunctions of the form, ‘p and I do not have justification to believe that p.’|
|Keywords||internalism externalism justification accessibility moore's paradox reliabilism mentalism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Declan Smithies (forthcoming). The Phenomenal Basis of Epistemic Justification. In Jesper Kallestrup & Mark Sprevak (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Mind. Palgrave MacMillan.
Gregory W. Dawes (2012). Justified Believing:Avoiding the Paradox. In James Maclaurin (ed.), Rationis Defensor: Essays in Honour of Colin Cheyne. Springer.
John Turri (2010). Refutation by Elimination. Analysis 70 (1):35-39.
Declan Smithies (forthcoming). Why Justification Matters. In David Henderson & John Greco (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Point and Purpose in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Peter J. Markie (2009). Justification and Awareness. Philosophical Studies 146 (3):361 - 377.
William Harper (1998). Papier Mâché Problems in Epistemology: A Defense of Strong Internalism. Synthese 116 (1):27-49.
Robert Audi (1991). Structural Justification. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:473-492.
David J. Alexander (2012). Inferential Internalism and Reflective Defeat. Philosophia 40 (3):497-521.
Tim Willenken (2011). Moorean Responses to Skepticism: A Defense. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 154 (1):1 - 25.
William Alston (1989). Epistemic Justification. Cornell University Press.
Anthony Brueckner (2011). Justification, Internalism, and Cream Cheese. Philosophical Papers 38 (1):13-20.
Juan Comesaña (2005). We Are (Almost) All Externalists Now. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):59–76.
Robert Hambourger (1984). Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Justification. Philosophy Research Archives 10:1-12.
Patrick Bondy (2013). Intensionality and Epistemic Justification. Philosophia 41 (2):463-475.
James Chase (2001). Is Externalism About Content Inconsistent with Internalism About Justification? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):227-46.
Added to index2010-10-29
Total downloads82 ( #11,409 of 722,699 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #36,274 of 722,699 )
How can I increase my downloads?