Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification

Abstract
This paper argues that justification is accessible in the sense that one has justification to believe a proposition if and only if one has higher-order justification to believe that one has justification to believe that proposition. I argue that the accessibility of justification is required for explaining what is wrong with believing Moorean conjunctions of the form, ‘p and I do not have justification to believe that p.’
Keywords internalism  externalism  justification  accessibility  moore's paradox  reliabilism  mentalism
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Citations of this work BETA
Declan Smithies (2012). Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):723-741.
Declan Smithies (2012). The Mental Lives of Zombies. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):343-372.
Daniel Greco (2014). A Puzzle About Epistemic Akrasia. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.
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Declan Smithies (2014). The Phenomenal Basis of Epistemic Justification. In Jesper Kallestrup & Mark Sprevak (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Mind. Palgrave MacMillan. 98-124.
Peter J. Markie (2009). Justification and Awareness. Philosophical Studies 146 (3):361 - 377.
Robert Audi (1991). Structural Justification. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:473-492.
Juan Comesaña (2005). We Are (Almost) All Externalists Now. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):59–76.
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