David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press 391--428 (1998)
We rely on language to know the minds of others, but does language have a role to play in knowing our own minds? To suppose it does is to look for a connection between mastery of a language and the epistemic relation we bear to our inner lives. What could such a connection consist in? To explore this, I shall examine strategies for explaining self-knowledge in terms of the use we make of language to express and report our mental states. Success in these strategies will depend on the view we take of speakers' understanding of the words they use to speak their minds. The key is to avoid circularity in the account of how they know what they mean; for if knowing what one is saying in speaking a language provides a means of knowing one's own mind, it cannot simply be a part of it. I shall look at ways in which we might proceed here, and examine whether the strategy can make room for a genuinely first-person point of view. But first let me try to motivate the problem of self-knowledge.
|Keywords||Self-Knoweldge First-person authority Knowledge of Language Davidson Knowing our own minds Knowing what we mean|
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Dorit Bar-On (2009). First-Person Authority: Dualism, Constitutivism, and Neo-Expressivism. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 71 (1):53 - 71.
Robert J. Howell (2007). Immunity to Error and Subjectivity. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):581-604.
William Child (2007). Davidson on First Person Authority and Knowledge of Meaning. Noûs 41 (2):157–177.
Neil Manson (2002). Epistemic Consciousness. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 33 (3):425-441.
Dorit Bar-On (2009). First-Person Authority: Dualism, Constitutivism, and Neo-Expressivism. Erkenntnis 71 (1):53-71.
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