On Not Being Sorry About The Morally Bad

Philosophy 80 (02):261 - 265 (2005)
Bad things often happen, and morally good people ought to be sorry that they happen. People are sometimes morally permitted not to do anything about such bad things, not to have to struggle to prevent them from occurring (otherwise the demands of morality would be excessive). But what could be more obvious to a good person than that one ought to be sorry about the occurrence of bad things? Even more so, it would seem, if the bad things occur in one’s vicinity, or one is involved with them. I shall argue that sometimes it is morally (at least) permissible not to be sorry when bad things happen. Perhaps it is even permissible to be happy about it
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DOI 10.1017/S0031819105000264
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