David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophia 22 (1-2):155-167 (1993)
Some philosophers hold that the tenseless theory of time entails the "temporal parts" theory of personal identity, that a person is a succession of distinct particulars. Some philosophers also believe that the tensed theory of time entails the "substance" or "continuant" theory of personal identity, that a person is a single particular that endures through time. I argue that these philosophers are mistaken. Both the tensed and tenseless theories of time are compatible with both theories of personal identity
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Bernardo J. Cantens (2001). A Solution to the Problem of Personal Identity in the Metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 75:121-134.
Steve Matthews (2010). Personal Identity, the Causal Condition, and the Simple View. Philosophical Papers 39 (2):183-208.
Trenton Merricks (1997). Fission and Personal Identity Over Time. Philosophical Studies 88 (2):163-186.
Eric T. Olson (2002). Personal Identity. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
R. G. Swinburne (1973). Personal Identity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74:231 - 247.
Gereon Kopf (2002). Temporality and Personal Identity in the Thought of Nishida Kitaro. Philosophy East and West 52 (2):224-245.
David Shoemaker (2010). The Insignificance of Personal Identity for Bioethics. Bioethics 24 (9):481-489.
Trenton Merricks (1999). Endurance, Psychological Continuity, and the Importance of Personal Identity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):983-997.
Roy W. Perrett & Charles Barton (1999). Personal Identity, Reductionism, and the Necessity of Origins. Erkenntnis 51 (2-3):277-94.
Eric Olson (2006). Is There a Bodily Criterion of Personal Identity? In Fraser MacBride (ed.), Identity and Modality. Oxford University Press. 242.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads27 ( #65,603 of 1,102,834 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #182,775 of 1,102,834 )
How can I increase my downloads?