Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):213-44 (2011)
|Abstract||The consensus in the philosophical literature on joint action is that, sometimes at least, when agents intentionally jointly φ, this is explicable by their intending that they φ, for a period of time prior to their φ-ing. If this be granted, it poses a dilemma. For agents who so intend either severally or jointly intend that they φ. The first option is ruled out by two stipulations that we may consistently make: (i) that at least one of the agents non-akratically believes that, all things considered, the agents ought not to φ, and (ii) that an agent is akratic, if she intends a thing that she believes, all things considered, ought not to be done. But the second option seems to entail the existence of a mental state with multiple subjects, which, in turn, seems to commit us to the existence of a group mind modified by that state: an incautious posit to say the least. I resolve the dilemma by noting that ‘They jointly intend’ is indeterminate between ‘They intend, jointly’, which does indeed entail that some mental state is an intention with multiple subjects, and ‘Jointly, they intend’, which entails a weaker claim, viz. that some mental state or states is an intention with multiple subjects. I then sketch an account of how a plurality of mental states, distributed among subjects, might, collectively, do service as their intention that they φ. It makes novel use of notions of participation and of doing a thing jointly with others. A corollary is that either intentions are not attitudes towards propositions, or propositions are individuated more finely than is often assumed.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Raimo Tuomela (2006). Joint Intention, We-Mode and I-Mode. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):35–58.
J. David Velleman (1997). How To Share An Intention. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):29 - 50.
Margaret P. Gilbert (2006). Rationality in Collective Action. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1):3-17.
Margaret Gilbert (2009). Shared Intention and Personal Intentions. Philosophical Studies 144 (1):167 - 187.
Sarah K. Paul (2012). How We Know What We Intend. Philosophical Studies 161 (2):327-346.
Margaret Gilbert (1997). Group Wrongs and Guilt Feelings. Journal of Ethics 1 (1):65-84.
Richard Scheer (2004). The ‘Mental State’ Theory of Intentions. Philosophy 79 (1):121-131.
Wiebe van der Hoek, Wojciech Jamroga & Michael Wooldridge (2007). Towards a Theory of Intention Revision. Synthese 155 (2):265-290.
Wiebe van Der Hoek, Wojciech Jamroga & Michael Wooldridge (2007). Towards a Theory of Intention Revision. Synthese 155 (2):265 - 290.
James Morauta (2010). In Defence of State-Based Reasons to Intend. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2):208-228.
Hugh J. McCann (1991). Settled Objectives and Rational Constraints. American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (1):25-36.
J. L. A. Garcia (1990). The Intentional and the Intended. Erkenntnis 33 (2):191 - 209.
Raimo Tuomela (2005). We-Intentions Revisited. Philosophical Studies 125 (3):327 - 369.
Gunnar Björnsson (2011). Joint Responsibility Without Individual Control: Applying the Explanation Hypothesis. In Jeroen van den Hoven, Ibo van de Poel & Nicole Vincent (eds.), Compatibilist Responsibility: beyond free will and determinism. Springer.
Added to index2011-05-18
Total downloads35 ( #39,252 of 722,929 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #36,863 of 722,929 )
How can I increase my downloads?