The connection between responsibility and desert: The crucial distinction
Mind 105 (419):485-486 (1996)
| Abstract | In Smilansky (1996) I proposed an outline of a theory of responsibility and desert, which I claimed both (a) enables us to see responsibility as a condition for desert even in the major apparent counter-examples such as those proposed in Feldman (1995); and (b) represents the ordinary way of seeing the connection between responsibility and desert better than previous formulations. Behind this proposal lies a crucial distinction between two ways in which responsibility can be a condition for desert. From Feldman’s reply (1996) it seems that this crucial distinction was not suffi- ciently brought out in my paper. | |||||||||
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Shelly Kagan (2012). The Geometry of Desert. Oxford University Press.
F. Feldman (1996). Responsibility as a Condition for Desert. Mind 105 (417):165-168.
Fred Feldman (1996). Responsibility as a Condition for Desert. Mind 105 (417):165-168.
Matt King (2012). Moral Responsibility and Merit. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (2).
S. Smilansky (1996). Responsibility and Desert: Defending The Connection. Mind 105 (417):157-163.
Saul Smilansky (1996). Responsibility and Desert: Defending the Connection. Mind 105 (417):157-163.
Carl Knight (2011). Responsibility, Desert, and Justice. In Carl Knight & Zofia Stemplowska (eds.), Responsibility and Distributive Justice. Oxford University Press.
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