Translucent experiences

Philosophical Studies 140 (2):197--212 (2008)
This paper considers the claim that perceptual experience is “transparent”, in the sense that nothing other than the apparent public objects of perception are available to introspection by the subject of such experience. I revive and strengthen the objection that blurred vision constitutes an insuperable objection to the claim, and counter recent responses to the general objection. Finally the bearing of this issue on representationalist accounts of the mind is considered.
Keywords Perception  Blurred vision  Transparency  Representationalism
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-007-9137-5
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References found in this work BETA
Michael G. F. Martin (2004). The Limits of Self-Awareness. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):37-89.

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Citations of this work BETA
Keith Allen (2013). Blur. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):257-273.

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