Translucent experiences

Philosophical Studies 140 (2):197--212 (2008)
This paper considers the claim that perceptual experience is “transparent”, in the sense that nothing other than the apparent public objects of perception are available to introspection by the subject of such experience. I revive and strengthen the objection that blurred vision constitutes an insuperable objection to the claim, and counter recent responses to the general objection. Finally the bearing of this issue on representationalist accounts of the mind is considered.
Keywords Perception  Blurred vision  Transparency  Representationalism
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    References found in this work BETA
    Kent Bach (1997). Engineering the Mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2):459-468.
    Fred Dretske (2003). Experience as Representation. Philosophical Issues 13 (1):67-82.
    Michael G. F. Martin (2004). The Limits of Self-Awareness. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):37-89.

    View all 12 references

    Citations of this work BETA
    Keith Allen (2013). Blur. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):257-273.
    Neil Mehta (2012). Exploring Subjective Representationalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):570-594.

    View all 7 citations

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