Philosophical Studies 140 (2):197--212 (2008)
|Abstract||This paper considers the claim that perceptual experience is “transparent”, in the sense that nothing other than the apparent public objects of perception are available to introspection by the subject of such experience. I revive and strengthen the objection that blurred vision constitutes an insuperable objection to the claim, and counter recent responses to the general objection. Finally the bearing of this issue on representationalist accounts of the mind is considered.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Dominic M. Mciver Lopes (2000). What Is It Like to See with Your Ears? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):439-453.
Michael G. F. Martin (2002). The Transparency of Experience. Mind and Language 4 (4):376-425.
Pierre le Morvan (2005). Intentionality: Transparent, Translucent, and Opaque. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:283-302.
Hannah Ginsborg (2006). Empirical Concepts and the Content of Experience. European Journal of Philosophy 14 (3):349-372.
Anders Nes (2006). Content in Thought and Perception. Dissertation, Oxford University
Leslie F. Stevenson (2000). Synthetic Unities of Experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):281-306.
Dominic M. M. Lopes (2000). What is It Like to See with Your Ears? The Representational Theory of Mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):439-453.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads115 ( #5,887 of 722,698 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #11,515 of 722,698 )
How can I increase my downloads?