Transmission failure explained

In this paper I draw attention to a peculiar epistemic feature exhibited by certain deductively valid inferences. Certain deductively valid inferences are unable to enhance the reliability of one's belief that the conclusion is true—in a sense that will be fully explained. As I shall show, this feature is demonstrably present in certain philosophically significant inferences—such as GE Moore's notorious 'proof' of the existence of the external world. I suggest that this peculiar epistemic feature might be correlated with the much discussed phenomenon that Crispin Wright and Martin Davies have called 'transmission failure'—the apparent failure, on the part of some deductively valid inferences to transmit one's justification for believing the premises.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00270.x
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Martin Smith (forthcoming). Full Blooded Entitlement. In Nikolaj Pedersen & Peter Graham (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford University Press
Chris Tucker (2010). When Transmission Fails. Philosophical Review 119 (4):497-529.

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