Transmission failure explained

Abstract
In this paper I draw attention to a peculiar epistemic feature exhibited by certain deductively valid inferences. Certain deductively valid inferences are unable to enhance the reliability of one's belief that the conclusion is true—in a sense that will be fully explained. As I shall show, this feature is demonstrably present in certain philosophically significant inferences—such as GE Moore's notorious 'proof' of the existence of the external world. I suggest that this peculiar epistemic feature might be correlated with the much discussed phenomenon that Crispin Wright and Martin Davies have called 'transmission failure'—the apparent failure, on the part of some deductively valid inferences to transmit one's justification for believing the premises.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA
    Michael Bergmann (2004). Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):709–727.
    Robert Brandom (1983). Asserting. Noûs 17 (4):637-650.
    James Chase (2004). Indicator Reliabilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):115–137.

    View all 42 references

    Citations of this work BETA
    Ian M. Church (2013). Getting 'Lucky' with Gettier. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):37-49.
    Martin Smith (2013). Entitlement and Evidence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):735-753.

    View all 7 citations

    Similar books and articles
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2009-01-28

    Total downloads

    140 ( #4,576 of 1,089,054 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    26 ( #3,915 of 1,089,054 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.