The incoherence argument: Reply to Schafer-Landau

Analysis 61 (3):254–266 (2001)
Abstract
Russ Schafer-Landau’s ‘Moral judgement and normative reasons’ is admirably clear and to the point (Schafer-Landau 1999). He presents his own version of the argument for the practicality requirement on moral judgement – that is, for the claim that those who have moral beliefs are either motivated or practically irrational – that I gave in The Moral Problem (Smith 1994), and he then proceeds to identify several crucial problems. In what follows I begin by making some comments about his presentation of the argument. I then confront the problems.
Keywords practicality requirement  The Moral Problem
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Michael Smith (2003). Humeanism, Psychologism, and the Normative Story. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):460–467.
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