Analysis 61 (3):254–266 (2001)
|Abstract||Russ Schafer-Landau’s ‘Moral judgement and normative reasons’ is admirably clear and to the point (Schafer-Landau 1999). He presents his own version of the argument for the practicality requirement on moral judgement – that is, for the claim that those who have moral beliefs are either motivated or practically irrational – that I gave in The Moral Problem (Smith 1994), and he then proceeds to identify several crucial problems. In what follows I begin by making some comments about his presentation of the argument. I then confront the problems.|
|Keywords||practicality requirement The Moral Problem|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Michael A. Smith (1995). Internalism's Wheel. Ratio 8 (3):277-302.
Mark van Roojen (2005). Rationalist Realism and Constructivist Accounts of Morality. Philosophical Studies 126 (2):285-295.
Joshua Gert (2008). Michael Smith and the Rationality of Immoral Action. Journal of Ethics 12 (1):1 - 23.
Alan H. Goldman (2010). Is Moral Motivation Rationally Required? Journal of Ethics 14 (1).
Russ Shafer-Landau (1998). Moral Judgement and Moral Motivation. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (192):353-358.
Jonas Olson (2002). Are Desires de Dicto Fetishistic? Inquiry 45 (1):89 – 96.
Neil Sinclair (2007). Expressivism and the Practicality of Moral Convictions. Journal of Value Inquiry 41:201-220.
Russ Shafer-Landau (1999). Moral Judgement and Normative Reasons. Analysis 59 (261):33–40.
Russ Shafer-Landau (2003/2005). Moral Realism: A Defence. Oxford University Press.
Stephen Finlay (2004). The Conversational Practicality of Value Judgement. Journal of Ethics 8 (3):205-223.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads40 ( #29,483 of 556,840 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #39,122 of 556,840 )
How can I increase my downloads?