The Impossibility of Token-Reflexive Analyses

Dialogue 25 (4):757 (1986)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Reichenbach, for example, believes that "1" has the same extensional meaning as "the person who utters this token", and Smart believes that "now" means the same as is simultaneous with this utterance” (where the italicization of the "is" indicates it is tenseless). But if a tokeri 1 of’ ’I’ , refers to itself, it has a different reference than a token.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,202

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
55 (#277,782)

6 months
3 (#880,460)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

References found in this work

Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
The mind-independence of temporal becoming.Quentin Smith - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 47 (1):109 - 119.
Elements of Symbolic Logic. [REVIEW]W. V. Quine - 1948 - Journal of Philosophy 45 (6):161-166.
Sentences about time.Quentin Smith - 1987 - Philosophical Quarterly 37 (146):37-53.
The relational sense of indirect discourse.Marc Temin - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (11):287-306.

View all 6 references / Add more references