The Impossibility of Token-Reflexive Analyses
| Abstract | Reichenbach, for example, believes that "1" has the same extensional meaning as "the person who utters this token", and Smart believes that "now" means the same as is simultaneous with this utterance” (where the italicization of the "is" indicates it is tenseless). But if a tokeri 1 of' 'I' , refers to itself, it has a different reference than a token.. | |||||||||
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