David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):343-372 (2012)
Could there be a cognitive zombie – that is, a creature with the capacity for cognition, but no capacity for consciousness? Searle argues that there cannot be a cognitive zombie because there cannot be an intentional zombie: on this view, there is a connection between consciousness and cognition that is derived from a more fundamental connection between consciousness and intentionality. However, I argue that there are good empirical reasons for rejecting the proposed connection between consciousness and intentionality. Instead, I argue that there is a connection between consciousness and cognition that is derived from a more fundamental connection between consciousness and rationality. On this view, there cannot be a cognitive zombie because there cannot be a rational zombie.
|Keywords||consciousness cognition zombies rationality intentionality functionalism belief subdoxastic state|
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Citations of this work BETA
Declan Smithies (2013). The Nature of Cognitive Phenomenology. Philosophy Compass 8 (8):744-754.
Joshua Shepherd (2015). Consciousness, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility: Taking the Folk Seriously. Philosophical Psychology 28 (7):929-946.
Declan Smithies (2013). The Significance of Cognitive Phenomenology. Philosophy Compass 8 (8):731-743.
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