David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):274 – 291 (1999)
We take as our starting point a thesis to the effect that, at least for true judgments of many varieties, there are parts of reality which make such judgments are true. We argue that two distinct components are involved in this truthmaker relation. On the one hand is the relation of necessitation, which holds between an object x and a judgment p when the existence of x entails the truth of p. On the other hand is the dual notion of projection, which holds between a judgment p and an object x when the truth of p entails the existence of x. A truthmaker for a judgment p is then a necessitator for p which satisfies the further constraint that it is part of p’s projection. We offer a formal theory of the truthmaker relation thus defined, exploiting ontological tools of basic mereology and the theory of dependence. We then apply the theory to a range of problems connected with generic expressions, ellipsis, vagueness, and indexical and perceptual judgments
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
D. M. Armstrong (1997). A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge University Press.
Peter M. Simons (1987). Parts: A Study in Ontology. Oxford University Press.
John Bigelow (1988). The Reality of Numbers: A Physicalist's Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford University Press.
Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons & Barry Smith (1984). Truth-Makers. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (3):287 - 321.
Citations of this work BETA
Jonathan Schaffer (2008). Truthmaker Commitments. Philosophical Studies 141 (1):7-19.
Benjamin Schnieder (2006). Truth-Making Without Truth-Makers. Synthese 152 (1):21-46.
Sam Baron (2013). Tensed Supervenience: A No‐Go for Presentism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (3):383-401.
Rachael Briggs (2012). Truthmaking Without Necessitation. Synthese 189 (1):11-28.
Timothy Perrine (2015). Undermining Truthmaker Theory. Synthese 192 (1):185-200.
Similar books and articles
Stephen Mumford (2007). Negative Truth and Falsehood. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt1):45 - 71.
Barry Smith & Berit Brogaard (2000). A Unified Theory of Truth and Reference. Logique Et Analyse 43 (169-170):49–93.
Ross P. Cameron (2008). Comments on Merricks's Truth and Ontology. Philosophical Books 49 (4):292-301.
Ross P. Cameron (2005). Truthmaker Necessitarianism and Maximalism. Logique Et Analyse 48 (189-192):43-56.
Jamin Asay (2011). Truthmaking, Truth, and Realism: New Work for a Theory of Truthmakers. Dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Barry Smith (2002). Truthmaker Realism: Response to Gregory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):231 – 234.
Ross P. Cameron (2008). How to Be a Truthmaker Maximalist. Noûs 42 (3):410 - 421.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads87 ( #50,897 of 1,934,424 )
Recent downloads (6 months)15 ( #37,129 of 1,934,424 )
How can I increase my downloads?