The realism in perception

Noûs 16 (March):42-55 (1982)
Abstract
Initially, Realism is related to perception and its intentionality, And perception is analyzed as a form of acquaintance, Or intuition, A direct cognitive relation to its object. Then several commitments to realism are detailed in the phenomenological content of everyday perception. At issue is internal, As opposed to external, Realism, In a sense defined. The demonstrative content of perception (i see "this object (visually before me)") contains a commitment to a causal relation between the perceptual experience and the object perceived, Hence a commitment to the object's independence from the experience, Hence realism. The content of a perception typically includes as well other implicit commitments to other "conditions of the possibility" of perceptual experience
Keywords Epistemology  Intentionality  Intuition  Naive Realism  Perception
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David Woodruff Smith (1986). The Ins and Outs of Perception. Philosophical Studies 49 (March):187-211.
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