The vagueness argument for mereological universalism

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):357–368 (2006)
Abstract
In this paper, I critically discuss one of the more influential arguments for mereological universalism, what I will call ‘the Vagueness Argument’. I argue that a premise of the Vagueness Argument is not well supported and that there are at least two good reasons for thinking that the premise in question is false.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2006.00266.x
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1983). New Work for a Theory of Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (December):343-377.

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Citations of this work BETA
David Vander Laan (2010). A Relevance Constraint on Composition. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):135-145.

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