Warranted assertibility and the norms of assertoric practice: Why truth and warranted assertibility are not coincident norms
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Ratio 18 (2):206–220 (2005)
Crispin Wright has argued that truth and warranted assertibility are coincident but non-co-extensive norms of assertoric practice and that this fact tends to inflate deflationary theories of truth. Wright’s inflationary argument has generated much discussion in the literature. By contrast, relatively little has been said about the claim that truth and warranted assertibility are coincident norms. This paper will examine that claim. Wright’s argument for the claim that truth and warranted assertibility are coincident norms is first clearly presented. It is then suggested that the argument trades on an ambiguity in ‘justified’ and ‘warrantedly assertible’. Finally, it is argued that, once the ambiguity is removed, there is reason to reject the claim that truth and epistemic warrant are coincident norms of assertoric practice. One important result is that no epistemic theory of truth can satisfy what Wright takes to be a platitude about assertion.
|Keywords||truth warranted assertibility assertoric practice|
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Citations of this work BETA
Deborah C. Smith (2007). Superassertibility and the Equivalence Schema: A Dilemma for Wright’s Antirealist. Synthese 157 (1):129-139.
Deborah C. Smith (2007). Superassertibility and the Equivalence Schema: A Dilemma for Wright's Antirealist. Synthese 157 (1):129 - 139.
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