In David Henderson & John Greco (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Point and Purpose in Epistemology. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
|Abstract||This chapter is guided by the hypothesis that the point and purpose of using the concept of justification in epistemic evaluation is tied to its role in the practice of critical reflection. In section one, I propose an analysis of justification as the epistemic property in virtue of which a belief has the potential to survive ideal critical reflection. In section two, I use this analysis in arguing for a form of access internalism on which one has justification to believe a proposition if and only if one has higher-order justification to believe that one has justification to believe that proposition. In section three, I distinguish between propositional and doxastic versions of access internalism and argue that the propositional version avoids familiar objections to the doxastic version. In section four, I argue that the propositional version of access internalism also explains and vindicates internalist intuitions about cases. In section five, I conclude with some reflections on the relationship between critical reflection, responsibility and personhood.|
|Keywords||justification internalism externalism idealization|
|External links||This entry has no external links. Add one.|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Declan Smithies (2012). Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):273-300.
John Greco (1990). Internalism and Epistemically Responsible Belief. Synthese 85 (2):245 - 277.
George Pappas (2006). Access Internalism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):159-169.
Anthony Brueckner (2011). Justification, Internalism, and Cream Cheese. Philosophical Papers 38 (1):13-20.
Colin Ruloff (2009). Epistemic Supervenience and Internalism: A Trilemma. Theoria 75 (2):129-151.
John Turri (2010). On the Relationship Between Propositional and Doxastic Justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):312-326.
William Harper (1998). Papier Mâché Problems in Epistemology: A Defense of Strong Internalism. Synthese 116 (1):27-49.
David J. Alexander (2012). Inferential Internalism and Reflective Defeat. Philosophia 40 (3):497-521.
John Gibbons (2006). Access Externalism. Mind 115 (457):19-39.
Michael Bergmann (2000). Deontology and Defeat. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):87-102.
B. J. C. Madison (2010). Epistemic Internalism. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):840-853.
William Alston (1989). Epistemic Justification. Cornell University Press.
Sven Bernecker (2006). Prospects for Epistemic Compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 130 (1):81-104.
S. Goldberg (2012). A Novel (and Surprising) Argument Against Justification Internalism. Analysis 72 (2):239-243.
Hamid Vahid (2005). Epistemic Justification and the Skeptical Challenge. Palgrave Macmillan.
Added to index2011-11-29
Total downloads99 ( #6,544 of 556,895 )
Recent downloads (6 months)32 ( #1,674 of 556,895 )
How can I increase my downloads?