Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (22):557-75 (2008)
|Abstract||The new Chomskian orthodoxy denies that our linguistic competence gives us knowledge *of* a language, and that the representations in the language faculty are representations *of* anything. In reply, I have argued that through their intuitions speaker/hearers, (but not their language faculties) have knowledge of language, though not of any externally existing language. In order to count as knowledge, these intuitions must track linguistic facts represented in the language faculty. I defend this idea against the objections Collins has raised to such an account.|
|Keywords||knowledge of language linguistic intuitions noam chomky language faculty|
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