Three grades of probabilistic involvement

Philosophical Studies 32 (2):129 - 142 (1977)
Though it has become a commonplace that probabilistic contexts are intentional, the precise sense in which this is true has never, to my knowledge, been stated. By making use of a relatively non-controversial set of distinctions regarding the grades of modal involvement, I am able to state more exactly than has been done previously the grade of intensionality which probability statements have prima facie. The distinctions I employ are, with certain qualifications, those introduced by Quine in his wellknown paper, Three Grades of Modal Involvement. By means of paraphrases, I am able to show that probability statements exemplify what Quine calls the third grade of modal involvement. Consequently, they are intensional in a way not acceptable to the majority of extensionalists.
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