Online research in philosophy

In the December 2004 issue of Teaching Philosophy, readers were challenged to respond to Richard Schmitt’s essay, “Is the Unexamined Life Not Worth Living?” Here is one response.

In the opening essay of The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays, Camus states that ‘There is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide. Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy’ (Camus, 2005: 1). He argues that all the other questions of philosophy, dealing with truth, knowledge, ethics, science, language and so on, are necessarily secondary to this question: ‘I therefore conclude that the meaning of life is the most urgent of questions’ (Camus, 2005: 2). The meaning of life – why am I here? How am I to live? What is my purpose? – is one of the most enduring questions in philosophy and psychology and it a question confronted by almost every individual at some point in life. This article provides a contemporary reflection on the relevance and validity of Camus’ thought regarding the connection between suicide and the meaning of life.

The work of Dan Brock and Helga Kuhse is typical of the current stream of thought rejecting the validity of sanctity of life appeals to instill objective inviolable worth in human life regardless of the quality of life of the patient. The context of a person's life is supremely important. In their systems life can have high value, yet the value of life can be outweighed by the force of other disvalues. The notion of quality of life has increasingly come to signify the measurement of the worth of a person's life itself. Having a life equals personal life. Any objectivity to life resides in 'personal', 'biographical', or 'creative' life, not mere biological life. Personal life represents the minimal threshold for any objective worth. In responding to this challenge, John Finnis has argued extensively that life is an intrinsic good – a basic human good. Following from our grasp of human life as a basic incommensurable good, it cannot be practically reasonable both to affirm that (a) 'human life is a basic human good', and (b) that 'human life qua human life can be intentionally acted against to its destruction'. Yet, if the good of human life can be considered self-evident, the self-evidence of the basic human good qua good does not mean that dialectical reasoning cannot be engaged in to indirectly support the practical reasonableness of respecting the good of human life in the deliberative choices that persons make concerning their actions. It is to the use of such dialectical reasoning, supportive of the status of human life as such a basic human good, that the article is primarily concerned to draw out and articulate.

Paul W. Taylor has defended a life-centered ethics that considers the inherent worth of all living things to be the same. l examine reasons for ascribing inherent worth to all living beings, but argue that there can be various levels of inherent worth. Differences in capacities among types of life are used to justify such levels. I argue that once levels of inherent worth are distinguished, it becomes reasonable torestrict rights to human beings.

The evaluation of whether an animal has a life worth living (LWL) has been suggested as a useful concept for farm animal policymaking. But there are a number of different ways in which the concept could be applied. This paper attempts to identify and evaluate candidate ethical principles based on the concept. It suggests that an appropriate principle by which to apply the concept is one that (1) is framed in terms of preventing an animal having a life worth avoiding (LWA), rather than ensuring they have LWL, (2) is based on a prospective, rather than retrospective, concept of a life’s worth, and (3) relates to both the perpetuation and creation of an animal at all times during its life. The paper concludes by endorsing an overarching principle that no animal should be unreasonably caused to be, or allowed to remain, in a position of having a prospective LWA.

A life worth living--a good life--is a life 'better than nothing'. At least that is a common thought. But it is puzzling. What does 'nothing' mean here? It cannot be a quantifier in the familiar sense, yet nor, it seems, can it be a referring term. To what could it refer? This paper aims to resolve the puzzle by examining a number of analyses of the concept of a life worth living. It distinguishes 'temporal analyses', which exploit the temporal structure of lives, from non-temporal ones. And it concludes that one temporal analysis, which it calls the 'Truncation Analysis', is the best of all the analyses considered.

Camus and James are not often thought to have much in common. But both agree that “Is life worth living?” is a fundamentalphilosophical question, and an examination of the views of each as to what constitutes a life that is worth living reveals strikingsimilarities. Although James freely uses the language of religion which Camus adamantly avoids, they agree that a life worth livingis marked by a sense of intimacy and communion with others and with the world itself—and by a resolve to fight against the evilsthat threaten well-being.

In this chapter I aim to clarify the conceptual and metaphysical relationships between a good life or a life worth living, on the one hand, and a meaningful life, on the other. There are some who maintain that talk of 'life's meaning' is by definition talk of a life worth living, and vice versa, but I argue against them, denying that these phrases connote the very same ideas. In addition to contending that the meanings of these phrases are different, I also argue that the properties these phrases refer to are different, i.e., that it is metaphysically possible for a life to be worth living and not meaningful, and even for a life to be meaningful but not worth living. In order to account for the close association theorists have tended to find between meaningfulness and worthwhileness, I suggest that there is overlap between the properties of a meaningful life and of a best life (as opposed to merely a good life).

Some philosophers have noted that there is a difference between the questions “Is life meaningful or purposeful?” and “Is life worth living?” However, what it is that makes these questions different has not been explored. Although the famed question about the meaning of life has received most of the attention, I argue that the better and more fruitful question is “Is life worth living?” When addressing the question “Is life worth living?” one takes into account benefits and costs that are ignored when considering the question “Is life purposeful?” thereby explaining how life can be purposeful, but not worth living. After exploring the differences between these questions, I then evaluate various ways of determining whether life is worth living. I argue that the best method for making this determination is to ask oneself whether or not one would have chosen to live one's life.

David Benatar argues that being brought into existence is always a net harm and never a benefit. I disagree. I argue that if you bring someone into existence who lives a life worth living (LWL), then you have not all things considered wronged her. Lives are worth living if they are high in various objective goods and low in objective bads. These lives constitute a net benefit. In contrast, lives worth avoiding (LWA) constitute a net harm. Lives worth avoiding are those that one should decline to live if given a synoptic view before birth. It is the prospect of a LWA that gives us good reason to not bring someone into existence. Happily, many lives are not worth avoiding. Contra Benatar, many are indeed worth living. Even if we grant Benatar his controversial asymmetry thesis, we have no reason to think that coming into existence is always a net harm.