David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Inquiry 40 (4):437-438 (1997)
There are currently two main philosophical theories of perception - Direct Realism and the Representative Theory. The former is supported by most contemporary philosophers, whereas the latter forms the groundwork for most scientific theories in this area. The paper describes a recent experiment involving retinal and cortical rivalry that provides strong empirical evidence that the Direct Realist theory is incorrect. There are of course a large number of related experiments on visual perception that would tend to lead us to the same conclusion, but the experiment described in this paper does so in a singularly direct and straightforward manner. Often the most telling experiments are the simplest
|Keywords||Empiricism Epistemology Object Perception Realism|
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References found in this work BETA
Richard L. Gregory (1981). Mind In Science: A History Of Explanations In Psychology And Physics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
John Smythies (2009). A Critique of Revonsuo's Theory of Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 22 (1):99 – 106.
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