Comment on Crooks's intertheoretic identification and mind-brain reductionism
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (3):245-248 (2002)
This paper focuses on perception and surveys the scientific evidence that the theory of direct realism adopted by most contemporary philosophers is incorrect. This evidence is provided by experiments on the spatial and temporal "filling-in" of percepts. It also examines the myth of the projection of sensations. The conclusion is that we do not perceive the world as it actually is, but as the brain computes it most probably to be
|Keywords||Brain Metaphysics Mind Perception Realism Reductionism Crooks, M|
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Citations of this work BETA
Stephen E. Robbins (2006). Bergson and the Holographic Theory of Mind. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (3-4):365-394.
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