Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Studies 166 (2):231-242 (2013)
|Abstract||Contrastivism about reasons is the view that ‘reason’ expresses a relation with an argument place for a set of alternatives. This is in opposition to a more traditional theory on which reasons are reasons for things simpliciter. I argue that contrastivism provides a solution to a puzzle involving reason claims that explicitly employ ‘rather than’. Contrastivism solves the puzzle by allowing that some fact might be a reason for an action out of one set of alternatives without being a reason for that action out of a different set of alternatives|
|Keywords||Contrastivism Reasons Reason ascriptions Practical reasoning|
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