David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (5):545 - 561 (2006)
Dual process theorists in psychology maintain that the mind’s workings can be explained in terms of conscious or controlled processes and automatic processes. Automatic processes are largely nonconscious, that is, triggered by environmental stimuli without the agent’s conscious awareness or deliberation. Automaticity researchers contend that even higher level habitual social behaviors can be nonconsciously primed. This article brings work on automaticity to bear on our understanding of habitual virtuous actions. After examining a recent intuitive account of habitual actions and habitual virtuous actions, the author offers her own explanation in terms of goal-dependent automaticity. This form of automaticity provides an account of habitual virtuous actions that explains the sense in which these actions are rational, that is, done for reasons. Habitual virtuous actions are rational in the sense of being purposive or goal-directed and are essentially linked with the agent’s psychological states. Unlike deliberative virtuous actions, the agent’s reasons for habitual virtuous actions are not present to her conscious awareness at the time of acting.
|Keywords||automaticity externalism goal-dependent automaticity habit internalism intervention control rational reasons virtue|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Michael Wiitala (2009). Contemplation and Action Within the Context of the Kalon. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 83:173-182.
Liezl van Zyl (2011). Right Action and the Non-Virtuous Agent. Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (1):80-92.
Jennifer Whiting (2002). Eudaimonia, External Results, and Choosing Virtuous Actions for Themselves. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):270-290.
Danny Frederick (2010). Unmotivated Intentional Action. Philosophical Frontiers 5 (1):21-30.
Francisco J. Varela (1999). Ethical Know-How: Action, Wisdom, and Cognition. Stanford University Press.
Bill Pollard (2003). Can Virtuous Actions Be Both Habitual and Rational? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (4):411-425.
Simon Wigley (2007). Automaticity, Consciousness and Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Psychology 20 (2):209-225.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads43 ( #43,730 of 1,140,179 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #46,991 of 1,140,179 )
How can I increase my downloads?