The formulation of disjunctivism: A response to fish

Abstract
Fish proposes that we need to elucidate what 'disjunctivism' stands for, and he also proposes that it stands for the rejection of a principle about the nature of experience that he calls the decisiveness principle. The present paper argues that his first proposal is reasonable, but then argues, in Section II, that his positive suggestion does not draw the line between disjunctivism and non-disjunctivism in the right place. In Section III, it is argued that disjunctivism is a thesis about the special nature of perceptual experience, and the thesis as elucidated here is then distinguished from and related to certain other ideas about perception, namely, direct realism and also McDowell's epistemological disjunctivism
Keywords Disjunction  Epistemology  Perception  Fish, William
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.0066-7373.2004.00106.x
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 17,844
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Heather Logue (2013). Good News for the Disjunctivist About the Bad Cases. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):105-133.
Craig French (2016). The Formulation of Epistemological Disjunctivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):86-104.
B. J. C. Madison (2010). Epistemic Internalism. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):840-853.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
William Fish, Disjunctivism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Berit Brogaard (2010). Disjunctivism. Oxford Annotated Bibliographies Online.
A. D. Smith (2008). Disjunctivism and Discriminability. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press
M. D. Conduct (2011). Naïve Realism and Extreme Disjunctivism. Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):201-221.
Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (2008). Either/Or. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press 314-19.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

161 ( #15,857 of 1,781,295 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

6 ( #108,046 of 1,781,295 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.