David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 2 (3):284-321 (1996)
We consider the informal concept of "computability" or "effective calculability" and two of the formalisms commonly used to define it, "(Turing) computability" and "(general) recursiveness". We consider their origin, exact technical definition, concepts, history, general English meanings, how they became fixed in their present roles, how they were first and are now used, their impact on nonspecialists, how their use will affect the future content of the subject of computability theory, and its connection to other related areas. After a careful historical and conceptual analysis of computability and recursion we make several recommendations in section §7 about preserving the intensional differences between the concepts of "computability" and "recursion." Specifically we recommend that: the term "recursive" should no longer carry the additional meaning of "computable" or "decidable;" functions defined using Turing machines, register machines, or their variants should be called "computable" rather than "recursive;" we should distinguish the intensional difference between Church's Thesis and Turing's Thesis, and use the latter particularly in dealing with mechanistic questions; the name of the subject should be "Computability Theory" or simply Computability rather than "Recursive Function Theory."
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Emil L. Post (1936). Finite Combinatory Processes-Formulation. Journal of Symbolic Logic 1 (3):103-105.
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Citations of this work BETA
Michael Rescorla (2015). The Representational Foundations of Computation. Philosophia Mathematica 23 (3):338-366.
Marcus Tomalin (2011). Syntactic Structures and Recursive Devices: A Legacy of Imprecision. [REVIEW] Journal of Logic, Language and Information 20 (3):297-315.
Aran Nayebi (2014). Practical Intractability: A Critique of the Hypercomputation Movement. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 24 (3):275-305.
Nir Fresco (2011). Concrete Digital Computation: What Does It Take for a Physical System to Compute? [REVIEW] Journal of Logic, Language and Information 20 (4):513-537.
Andris Ambainis, John Case, Sanjay Jain & Mandayam Suraj (2004). Parsimony Hierarchies for Inductive Inference. Journal of Symbolic Logic 69 (1):287-327.
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