Graduate studies at Western
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):321-370 (1999)
|Abstract||Quine's argument for indeterminacy and inscrutability equivocates about what it is for one set of truths to determine another. In addition to being unsupported, these doctrines lead Quine to reject our ordinary notions of meaning, truth, and reference in favor of certain replacement notions, including stimulus meaning, and disquotational, or Tarski, truth and reference for one's own present language. This is self-defeating. To formulate the doctrines of physicalism, underdetermination, indeterminacy, and inscrutability, one must refer to the totality of true propositions about the subject matter of physics, and it's relation to all other propositions--something precluded by Quine's semantic eliminativism|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Forrai (1999). Are Quine’s Two Indeterminacy Theses Compatible? Acta Analytica 14 (23.):89-99..
Günter Abel (1994). Indeterminacy and Interpretation. Inquiry 37 (4):403 – 419.
Timothy McCarthy (2002). Radical Interpretation and Indeterminacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Henry Jackman (1996). Radical Interpretation and the Permutation Principle. Erkenntnis 44 (3):317-326.
Austen Clark (2006). Attention and Inscrutability: A Commentary on John Campbell, Reference and Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 127:167-193.
Itay Shani (2005). Intension and Representation: Quine's Indeterminacy Thesis Revisited. Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):415 – 440.
Matti Eklund (2007). The Ontological Significance of Inscrutability. Philosophical Topics 35 (1-2):115-134.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads24 ( #57,963 of 740,406 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #26,535 of 740,406 )
How can I increase my downloads?