The indeterminacy of translation and the inscrutability of reference

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):321-370 (1999)
Quine's argument for indeterminacy and inscrutability equivocates about what it is for one set of truths to determine another. In addition to being unsupported, these doctrines lead Quine to reject our ordinary notions of meaning, truth, and reference in favor of certain replacement notions, including stimulus meaning, and disquotational, or Tarski, truth and reference for one's own present language. This is self-defeating. To formulate the doctrines of physicalism, underdetermination, indeterminacy, and inscrutability, one must refer to the totality of true propositions about the subject matter of physics, and it's relation to all other propositions--something precluded by Quine's semantic eliminativism.
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Alex Byrne (2007). Soames on Quine and Davidson. Philosophical Studies 135 (3):439-449.
Alex Byrne (2007). Soames on Quine and Davidson. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 135 (3):439 - 449.

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