Why propositions cannot be sets of truth-supporting circumstances

Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (3):267 - 276 (2008)
No semantic theory satisfying certain natural constraints can identify the semantic contents of sentences (the propositions they express), with sets of circumstances in which the sentences are true–no matter how fine-grained the circumstances are taken to be. An objection to the proof is shown to fail by virtue of conflating model-theoretic consequence between sentences with truth-conditional consequence between the semantic contents of sentences. The error underlines the impotence of distinguishing semantics, in the sense of a truth-based theory of logical consequence, and semantics, in the sense of a theory of meaning.
Keywords propositions  semantics  semantic contents  truth-supporting circumstances
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Chad Carmichael (2016). Deep Platonism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):307-328.
Benjamin Jarvis (2012). The Dual Aspects Theory of Truth. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (3-4):209-233.

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