Against direction of fit accounts of belief and desire

Analysis 61 (1):44-53 (2001)
We argue that beliefs and desires cannot be successfully explicated in terms of direction of fit. It is more difficult than has been realized to do so without presupposing these notions in the explication.
Keywords Belief  Desire  Epistemology  Metaphor  Hume  Smith, M
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DOI 10.1111/1467-8284.00268
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Hallvard Lillehammer (2002). Moral Cognitivism. Philosophical Papers 31 (1):1-25.

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