Against direction of fit accounts of belief and desire
Analysis 61 (1):44-53 (2001)
| Abstract | We argue that beliefs and desires cannot be successfully explicated in terms of direction of fit. It is more difficult than has been realized to do so without presupposing these notions in the explication. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Belief Desire Epistemology Metaphor Hume Smith, M | |||||||||
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