Against direction of fit accounts of belief and desire

Analysis 61 (1):44-53 (2001)
Abstract
We argue that beliefs and desires cannot be successfully explicated in terms of direction of fit. It is more difficult than has been realized to do so without presupposing these notions in the explication.
Keywords Belief  Desire  Epistemology  Metaphor  Hume  Smith, M
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    Zed Adams (2011). Moral Mistakes. Philosophical Investigations 34 (1):1-21.
    Attila Tanyi (2011). Sobel on Pleasure, Reason, and Desire. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (1):101-115.

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