Backward-induction arguments: A paradox regained

Philosophy of Science 60 (1):114-133 (1993)
According to a familiar argument, iterated prisoner's dilemmas of known finite lengths resolve for ideally rational and well-informed players: They would defect in the last round, anticipate this in the next to last round and so defect in it, and so on. But would they anticipate defections even if they had been cooperating? Not necessarily, say recent critics. These critics "lose" the backward-induction paradox by imposing indicative interpretations on rationality and information conditions. To regain it I propose subjunctive interpretations. To solve it I stress that implications for ordinary imperfect players are limited
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DOI 10.1086/289721
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