David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):361-383 (2001)
Moral properties would supervene upon non-moral properties and be conceptually autonomous. That, according to Simon Blackburn, would make them if not impossible at least mysterious, and evidence for them best explained by theorists who say they are not real. In fact moral properties would not challenge in ways Blackburn has contended. There is, however, something new that can be gathered from his arguments. What would the supervenience of moral properties and their conceptual autonomy from at least total non-moral properties entail not only for Intuitionists, who ‘knew this all along,’ but for all moral realists, that there are synthetic necessary moral principles? There is for all moral realists the problem of explaining ‘what in the world’ makes possible these necessities.
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References found in this work BETA
W. D. Ross (2002). The Right and the Good. Clarendon Press.
Michael Smith (1994). The Moral Problem. Blackwell.
Simon Blackburn (1984). Spreading the Word. Clarendon Press.
R. M. Hare (1981). Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Chris Meyers (2012). Expressivism, Constructivism, and the Supervenience of Moral Properties. Philosophical Explorations 15 (1):17-31.
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