David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (1):11-18 (1985)
constructive empiricism asserts that it is not for science to reach a verdict on whether a theory is true or false, if the theory is about unobservable entities; science's only interest here, says Van Fraassen, is to discover whether the theory is ‘empirically adequate’. However, if a theory is soley about observables, empirical adequacy and truth are said to ‘coincide’, here discovering the theory's truth value is an appropriate scientific goal. Constructive empiricism thus rests an epistemological thesis on a semantical distinction. This paper critically examines the notion of aboutness and its epistemological significance. * I am grateful to members of my philosophy of science seminar during Spring, 1983 for useful discussion and to the two anonymous referees of this journal for providing helpful suggestions. I also thank the University of Wisconsin, Madison Graduate School for support in the form of a Romnes Faculty Fellowship.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
James Ladyman, Otávio Bueno, Mauricio Suárez & Bas van Fraassen (2011). Scientific Representation: A Long Journey From Pragmatics to Pragmatics. [REVIEW] Metascience 20 (3):417-442.
F. A. Muller & B. C. van Fraassen (2008). How to Talk About Unobservables. Analysis 68 (299):197–205.
Malcolm Forster (1988). Unification, Explanation, and the Composition of Causes in Newtonian Mechanics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 19 (1):55-101.
Similar books and articles
F. A. I. Buekens & F. A. Muller (2012). Intentionality Versus Constructive Empiricism. Erkenntnis 76 (1):91-100.
Sam Mitchell (1988). Constructive Empiricism and Anti-Realism. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:174 - 180.
Peter Lipton (2006). What Can Bas Believe? Musgrave and Van Fraassen on Observability. Analysis 66 (3):226 - 233.
Jamin Asay (2009). Constructive Empiricism and Deflationary Truth. Philosophy of Science 76 (4):423-443.
Paul Dicken (2009). Constructive Empiricism and the Vices of Voluntarism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (2):189 – 201.
Bradley Monton & Bas C. van Fraassen (2003). Constructive Empiricism and Modal Nominalism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (3):405-422.
Guillaume Rochefort-Maranda (2011). Constructive Empiricism and the Closure Problem. Erkenntnis 75 (1):61-65.
Warren Bourgeois (1987). On Rejecting Foss's Image of Van Fraassen. Philosophy of Science 54 (2):303-308.
Bas C. van Fraassen (2001). Constructive Empiricism Now. Philosophical Studies 106 (1-2):151 - 170.
James Ladyman (2000). What's Really Wrong with Constructive Empiricism? Van Fraassen and the Metaphysics of Modality. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4):837-856.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads28 ( #62,300 of 1,101,623 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #178,496 of 1,101,623 )
How can I increase my downloads?