David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 52 (2):65-80 (2002)
This paper defends two theses about probabilistic reasoning. First, although modus ponens has a probabilistic analog, modus tollens does not – the fact that a hypothesis says that an observation is very improbable does not entail that the hypothesis is improbable. Second, the evidence relation is essentially comparative; with respect to hypotheses that confer probabilities on observation statements but do not entail them, an observation O may favor one hypothesis H1 over another hypothesis H2 , but O cannot be said to confirm or disconfirm H1 without such relativization. These points have serious consequences for the Intelligent Design movement. Even if evolutionary theory entailed that various complex adaptations are very improbable, that would neither disconfirm the theory nor support the hypothesis of intelligent design. For either of these conclusions to follow, an additional question must be answered: With respect to the adaptive features that evolutionary theory allegedly says are very improbable, what is their probability of arising if they were produced by intelligent design? This crucial question has not been addressed by the ID movement.
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Jordan Howard Sobel (2009). Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens for Conditional Probabilities, and Updating on Uncertain Evidence. Theory and Decision 66 (2):103 - 148.
Noël Carroll (2004). Art and Human Nature. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 62 (2):95–107.
Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater (2009). The Uncertain Reasoner: Bayes, Logic, and Rationality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):105-120.
Friedel Weinert (2010). The Role of Probability Arguments in the History of Science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (1):95-104.
Similar books and articles
Branden Fitelson (1999). How Not to Detect Design. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 66 (3):472 - 488.
Sahotra Sarkar (2011). The Science Question in Intelligent Design. Synthese 178 (2):291 - 305.
Elliott Sober (1999). How Not to Detect Design. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 66 (3):472 - 488.
Chunyu Dong (2010). Intelligent Design From the Viewpoint of Complex Systems Theory. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 5 (3):461-470.
Elliott Sober (2008). Intelligent Design, Irreducible Complexity, and Minds—a Reply to John Beaudoin. Faith and Philosophy 25 (4):443-446.
John Angus Campbell & John Mark Reynolds, The Design Inference: Eliminating Chance Through Small Probabilities.
Elliott Sober & E. Sober (2007). Sex Ratio Theory, Ancient and Modern: An Eighteenth-Century Debate About Intelligent Design and the Development of Models in Evolutionary Biology. In Jessica Riskin (ed.), Genesis Redux: Essays in the History and Philosophy of Artificial Life. University of Chicago Press. 131--62.
William Albert Dembski (1996). The Design Inference: Eliminating Chance Through Small Probabilities. Dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads194 ( #4,438 of 1,692,915 )
Recent downloads (6 months)42 ( #2,815 of 1,692,915 )
How can I increase my downloads?